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I. INTRODUCTION
This article evaluates Section 936 of the Internal Revenue
Code from the perspective of the infrastructure development which
has taken place in Puerto Rico over the past forty years. Section
936, the possessions tax credit, is specifically directed at encourag-
ing investment in Puerto Rico.' The statute allows a tax sparing
credit for the full amount of U.S. tax liability on possessions source
income regardless of the amount of tax paid in Puerto Rico.2 In
addition, the statute provides for tax-free dividends returned to
1. I.R.C. § 936 (1986).
2. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 380 (1986).
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the mainland. The favorable tax situation for Puerto Rico has fos-
tered the growth of high technology industries there.
Amendments to the statute in 1982 were aimed at curbing the
abuses of some of the high-technology industries investing in Pu-
erto Rico.' Treasury informed Congress that improper allocation of
intangible income between related parties combined with the pos-
sessions tax credit was a problem with the statute. In order not to
"throw out the baby with the bath water,"4 Congress left the credit
in tact, but added requirements concerning the transfer of
intangibles.
Section 936 survived the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but not
without threats that it should be replaced by a wage credit. Once
again, the cost of the statute and abuses by high technology indus-
tries were at the heart of the problems with the statute. As part of
its lobbying efforts to keep the statute, the government of Puerto
Rico proposed a twin plant project. The twin plant project encour-
ages companies with operations in Puerto Rico to establish manu-
facturing operations in "qualified Caribbean Basin Initiative
countries.""
Since its enactment in 1976, Section 936 has been controver-
sial. Although some view the statute as Puerto Rico's lifeline,
others view it as costly and a giveaway to the drug companies and
other high technology industries investing in Puerto Rico. The first
part of this article looks at the effect of the United States' incon-
sistent policy towards Puerto Rico and reviews U.S. laws and con-
straints on the economic development of Puerto Rico over the past
eighty years. The second part of this article critically reviews Trea-
sury's analysis of the possessions tax credit and suggestions to re-
place the possessions tax credit with a wage credit. The article con-
cludes that Section 936 is necessary in order for Puerto Rico to be
competitive with similarly situated economies and concludes that
the United States must define its role vis-&-vis the development of
Puerto Rico's economy before it can determine the role of Section
936.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 936(h) (1982).
4. 128 CoNG REC. S8802 (daily ed. July 21, 1982)(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
5. I.R.C. § 936(d)(4) (1986).
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II. PUERTO Rico's POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATION
Puerto Rico is an island located in the Greater Antilles Group.
Puerto Rico is 100 miles wide and thirty miles long. The topogra-
phy of the island is varied. The interior region is mountainous,
while some of the coastal areas are deserts. Puerto Rico is sur-
rounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the north and east, the Carib-
bean Sea to the south, and the Mona Passage which separates the
island from Hispafiola to the east.'
A. Puerto Rico as a Spanish Colony
Puerto Rico was "discovered" by Christopher Columbus in
1493 and remained a Spanish colony until 1898. The Spanish
hoped to find gold in Puerto Rico, but their dreams were never
realized. In the early nineteenth century, the economy of the island
focused on small farms.7 As early as the nineteenth century, the
economic policy which dominated Puerto Rico emphasized the
production of export products such as sugar, coffee, tobacco, and
cattle, and the importation of most of its food supply.'
Throughout the 1800s, Puerto Rico was involved in a pro-
longed struggle to gain greater measures of self-control from Spain.
The Charter of Autonomy granted by Spain in 1897 gave Puerto
Rico home rule. This grant of political power by Spain was the first
of many Puerto Rico would receive in return for its strategic de-
fense position. The Charter was directed at Cuba to head off
United States support of Cuban rebels. However, because Cuba
and Puerto Rico were part of the same Spanish Antilles group, Pu-
erto Rico received the Charter at the same time it was granted to
Cuba."
Although the governor of Puerto Rico was appointed by Spain,
under the Charter of Autonomy, the insular parliament was par-
tially elected. The insular parliament was empowered to legislate
on local matters, to regulate tariffs, and with the approval of the
Spanish Cortes, to negotiate commercial treaties. Spanish sover-
eignty, though, was preserved by a veto clause over local laws.1"
6. See generally R. Pico, THE GEOGRAPHY OF PUERTO Rico (1974).
7. See generally K. WAGENHEIM, THE PUERTO RICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1973).
8. See generally H. PERLOFF, PUERTO RICO'S ECONOMIC FUTURE 15 (1950).
9. See generally R. CARR, PUERTO RICO: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT (1984).
10. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, PUERTO Rico's POLITICAL FUTURE A DIVISIVE ISSUE WITH
[Vol. 19:1
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B. Puerto Rico: 1900-1940
1. Political Structure
Ironically, the same war which allowed Puerto Rico self-gov-
ernment, also put Puerto Rico under United States control. In
1898 Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States under the
Treaty of Paris, and Puerto Rico lost its gains towards autonomous
rule.'1 The United States began its occupation of Puerto Rico on
July 25, 1898, and continued its military occupation until 1900.
Congress passed the Foraker Act, Puerto Rico's first Organic
Act, on April 12, 1900.12 This Act abolished the military govern-
ment in Puerto Rico and established a civilian government. In do-
ing so it set forth the foundation for Puerto Rico's relationship
with the United States."
The purpose of the Foraker Act was "temporarily to provide
revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico [sic] and for other
purposes." 14 The Act provided for executive, legislative, and judi-
cial branches in Puerto Rico. 15 Under the Foraker Act the chief
executive was a "Governor of Porto Rico [sic]" appointed by the
President of the United States.'" In addition, the President ap-
pointed an executive council consisting of eleven members, six of
whom were Puerto Rican, with administrative authority.1"
All local legislative activities were vested in a legislative as-
sembly which consisted of two houses. 8 The legislative authority
extended "to all matters of a legislative character not locally inap-
plicable" with the proviso that Congress reserved the power to an-
nul the local laws. 19
The general provisions of the Foraker Act were that the laws
and ordinances of Puerto Rico under Spanish rule were to con-
MANY DIMENSIONS, REP. No. GGD-81-48 (Mar. 2, 1981)[hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL].
11. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No.
343.
12. Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (a provision similar to §1 of the Act is
codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731 (1987)).
13. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 10, at 10.
14. Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 17.
17. Id. §§ 18-26.
18. Id. § 27.
19. Id. §§ 31-32.
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tinue2 U.S. currency would be the official legal tender.21 More-
over, statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable
would have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the
United States, except for the internal revenue laws.22
The Foraker Act provided a motley assortment of rights, privi-
leges and obligations. The Foraker Act provided that although not
citizens, Puerto Rican residents came under the protection of the
United States.28 The Act provided for a resident commissioner
elected by Puerto Ricans who was to serve as the official represen-
tative to the United States. The commissioner, though, was not a
voting representative.2 However, the Act also provided that Pu-
erto Rico would not pay any federal taxes to the United States.
Thus the accusation of taxation without representation could not
be made.2
5
From an economic perspective the two most significant parts
of the legislation involved shipping laws and tariffs. The Foraker
Act provided that all shipping between the United States and Pu-
erto Rico was subject to U.S. coastal shipping laws.2 In addition,
the Foraker Act provided that any tariffs, customs or duties on ar-
ticles brought into Puerto Rico from third countries, or duties and
taxes on articles brought into the United States from Puerto Rico
were to go to the Puerto Rican Treasury.
7
The initial debate over Puerto Rico's economic ties with the
United States focussed on a tariff provided by the Foraker Act.
The Foraker Act provided for a tariff of fifteen percent between
the United States and Puerto Rico on all articles of merchandise
coming into Puerto Rico from the United States and vice versa.
This tariff was to last until a system of local taxation could be es-
tablished in Puerto Rico or until the first day of March, 1902.28
The duties collected under this tariff system were not to be placed
into the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, but were to be placed
in a separate fund for the benefit of Puerto Rico and, when a civil-
20. Id. § 8.
21. Id. § 11.
22. Id. § 14.
23. Id. § 7.
24. Id. § 39.
25. R. CARR, supra note 9, at 37.
26. The Foraker Act, supra note 13, § 9.
27. Proclamation No. 8, 32 Stat. 1983 (1901)(in accord with this provision, President
McKinley issued a proclamation on July 25, 1901).
28. Id.
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ian government was established in Puerto Rico, were to go directly
to the Puerto Rican Treasury."
The "sugar trust," a group of large American sugar corpora-
tions, lobbied for the tariff between the mainland and Puerto
Rico.3 0 Some believed the temporary imposition of the tariff was
nothing more than political manipulation to allow the sugar trust
to buy large land holdings at reduced prices.31 The belief was that
the tariff would depress the sugar prices, forcing small farmers to
sell out.
In the debate over the imposition of the tariff, the issue of how
the United States should treat its dependencies was raised. On one
hand the argument for the imposition of the tariff was supported
by the view that
[N]ations have always acted and should govern themselves at all
times upon principles entirely different from those which actu-
ate individuals .... In looking at the question of any foreign
territory the only question that should enter into consideration
by us is one question: Is it best for the United States? The weal
or woe, the misery or happiness, the poverty or prosperity of the
foreigner or those to be annexed is not involved.32
On the other hand, the argument for free trade was supported
by the view that what is best for the territories is best for the
United States. Under this view, linkages between mainland United
States and Puerto Rico promote the economic well-being of both
the United States and the territory."3
29. Id.
30. 33 CONG. REc. 2278 (1900).
31. Supplementing the Foraker Act was a limitation upon the corporate ownership of
land. 31 Stat. 716 (1900). The limitation of 500 acres was an outgrowth of the free trade bill
for Puerto Rico. Some attribute the 500 acre limit to sugar production lobbyists who did not
want new competition. Others view the limitation as a U.S. moral obligation to prevent large
trusts from acquiring Puerto Rico's best lands. See Note, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The
History of an Instructive Experiment, 73 YALE L.J. 334, 335 (1963) (authored by Keith S.
Rosenn). Regardless of the reason for the statute, it was ignored until the 1940's. Puerto
Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc., 309 U.S. 543 (1940).
32. See supra note 30.
33. CONG. REC 2272-73 (1900) (daily ed.). Rep. James R. Williams (D-Ill.) described the
benefits that could be developed without a tariff and the harm that would result if the
temporary tariff were imposed.
Free trade with Puerto Rico would cause large sums of money to be invested in
that island, breathe new life into their paralyzed industries, build up new ones,
increase the opportunities of the laboring people, enable them to earn their own
food and clothing, pay their own taxes, buy their own books, build their own
schoolhouses, and become well-to-do citizens. This is just what the people of
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1
Regardless of the motivation for the temporary tariff, the Su-
preme Court decided that the imposition of the tariff under the
Foraker Act was constitutional. In Downes v. Bidwell, an American
firm sought to recover duties paid under protest on a shipment of
oranges brought from Puerto Rico to New York in November 1900,
after the passage of the Foraker Act.34 The Court held the duties
were not prohibited by the Constitution even though the Constitu-
tion declares "all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States." '35 In the case of unincorporated ter-
ritories the issue which arises is not whether the Constitution ap-
plies but whether the provision is applicable.3
The Court found that Puerto Rico is a "territory appurtenant
and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United
States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution." Thus, du-
ties imposed upon imports from Puerto Rico under the Foraker
Act were held to be constitutional.3 "
In addition, the Court found Puerto Rico to be an unincorpo-
rated territory of the United States. Its citizens came under the
Puerto Rico want. We must not lose sight of the fact that the people of the
United States would be benefited by the course I have suggested. We can benefit
Puerto Rico and at the same time benefit our own people.
Every pound of sugar, tobacco and coffee imported from Puerto Rico into
the United States will be paid for with our flour, meal, meat, clothing, machin-
ery, and other American products and the balance of trade is sure to be in our
favor. If such an arrangement should result in reducing the price of sugar in this
country, the benefit would go to the consumer. So we can surely afford to be just
to the people of Puerto Rico when it is so greatly to our interest to do so ....
Mr. Chairman, Puerto Rico needs free trade now, the best market she can
get for her products. As I have stated, free trade with Puerto Rico would at once
carry large investments to that island in the sugar and tobacco business, increase
the volume of money there, increase business of all kinds and would immediately
increase the value of lands in the island. This would enable the landowners, who
are heavily mortgaged, as the evidence shows, to renew their loans and save their
land. But sir, if you delay free trade to Puerto Rico for two years, or even one
year, the value of these lands will continue low, they will not be able to extend
their loans, they will lose their lands under mortgage, the sugar trust will have
the opportunity to go in and buy them up at low prices; then the Republicans, I
suppose, will be ready to admit sugar from that island free ....
I want to say to the gentlemen on the other side, who are so anxious to
protect the American people against the pauper labor of that little island, in
God's name, give it just laws, good government, and you will have no pauper
labor there in a few years to contend against . . . .Drive it out of the island as
well as the rest of the United States.
34. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287 (White, J., concurring).
37. Id.
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protection of the United States, but were not U.S. citizens. Under
the principles of the Constitution, they were entitled to certain
natural rights of life, liberty, and property, but they were not enti-
tled to certain remedial rights, such as suffrage.3 8
In 1917 Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship by a new
Organic Act, the Jones Act." The bill, which also gave Puerto Rico
self-government, was approved by the U.S. Senate on February 20,
1917, and was signed into law by President Wilson on March 2,
1917. Many viewed this granting of citizenship (when the U.S. was
involved in World War I) as a measure to secure the Caribbean.40
The Jones Act gave Puerto Rico the right to tax income arising
from sources within Puerto Rico.4
This new Organic Act, the Jones Act, included a bill of rights
and authorized a popularly elected nineteen-member Senate as a
coequal companion to the thirty-nine member House.42 Most of
the members of the Executive Council were to be appointed by the
Governor, rather than by the President.4 3 Puerto Rican Supreme
Court Justices, the Governor, and several council members, how-
ever, continued to be appointed by the President."
Though it granted more self-governing powers, the Congress
retained the right to nullify any local law.45 Additionally, the Gov-
ernor could refer legislation to the President for final disposition.4
Citizenship, however, was a passive citizenship that denied Puerto
Ricans representation in Congress. The Puerto Rican Resident
Commissioner was elected by Puerto Ricans, but did not have a
vote in Congress.4 7 One commentator described the Jones Act as
making clear "that the domestic constitution of Puerto Rico repre-
sented not the will of Puerto Ricans but the will of Congress."48
38. Id. at 282-83.
39. The Jones Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
40. 53 CONG. REC. 7474 (1916).
41. The Jones Act, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. R. CARR, supra note 9, at 53.
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2. Puerto Rico's Economy as a U.S. Possession
During the first thirty years of Puerto Rico's possession status
with the United States, absentee landlords developed the sugar in-
dustry." ' One commentator views these years as a positive develop-
ment, in Puerto Rico's history. From this perspective, even though
Puerto Rico suffered the consequences of land monopoly, absentee
ownership, and a large class of seasonally employed field workers,
the influx of funds created new industries."
Other commentators have viewed both these years and the
years of the 1930's as a devastating time for the Puerto Rican
economy.0 1 Under this analysis, the economic position of Puerto
Rico was dominated by U.S. corporations. The sugar industry, as
well as the tobacco, manufacturing and fruit growing industries,
banks, railroads, public utilities, steamship lines, and many lesser
businesses, were partially or completely dominated by outside cap-
ital. Approximately sixty percent of the sugar crop was grown by
American and other absentee companies, and the sugar cane was
grown on all fertile farm land. The effect of this land concentration
was disastrous to the agricultural economy.2
Instead of the small farming economy of the 1800's, the econ-
omy of the early 1900's focused on large land holdings with absen-
tee investors receiving the dividends. The "joker in the deck" was
that even though there were profits, and statistically, the economy
appeared to be productive, all of the profits were being exported
out of Puerto Rico to the absentee landlords.6 3 The small farmer
was forced off his land to become a day laborer. In addition, the
large land tracts devoted to sugar production, rather than food
crops, forced the island consumer to import food from the United
States, or from other markets with a tariff imposed on it.6 4
By the time the Depression hit, Puerto Rico had thirty-six
percent unemployment, compared with seventeen percent in 1899,
and the wages plummeted to such a degree that a laborer needed
to spend 104 days working to buy imported foods that once cost
49. H. PERLOFF, supra note 8.
50. Id. at 25-26.
51. See generally K. WAGENHEIM, supra note 7.
52. See supra note 30; H. PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 34.
53. B.W. DIFFIE & J.W. DIFFIE, PORTO Rico [sic]: A BROKER PLEDGE 201 (1931).
54. See also H. PERLOFF, supro note 8; Cf. B.W DIFFIE & J W DWFiE, supra note 53, at
22 (arguing that by the time the United States acquired Puerto Rico, there was already a
growing dependence on imported food. See generally K. WACENHEIM, supra note 7, at 5.
[Vol. 19:1
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him seventy days of work."5
"If the condition of the masses of the Island people in the pe-
riod before 1928 could be described as 'deplorable,' then the situa-
tion of the Puerto Rican people in the next thirteen years can only
be described as bordering on the 'critical.' "56 Beginning in the
mid-1930's, the New Deal Programs were expanded to Puerto Rico.
Although $1 million per month was spent in Puerto Rico,"7 the
programs "consisted of little more than filling empty stomachs and
mitigating suffering""8 and did not tackle the structural problems
of Puerto Rico's underdeveloped economy.59
C. Puerto Rico Under Operation Bootstrap
1. Phase I: 1940-1948
Operation Bootstrap, which began in 1940, was the Puerto Ri-
can government's two-stage program to improve the island's eco-
nomic condition. The first stage lasted from 1941 until 1948 and
has been described as a "socialist experiment."6 One component
of this first stage was a redistribution of the land held by the large
sugar corporations. The Land Law of 1941 and the Land Authority
created by it provided for the enforcement of a 500-acre land hold-
ing provision. The 500-acre land holding provision had been law
since 1900, but had never been enforced.61 Under the Operation
Bootstrap program, the large corporations' lands were redis-
tributed in a manner designed to answer the need for land reform
while retaining large-scale. operations efficiency in the sugar indus-
try. Specifically, the sugar operations profits were to be distributed
proportionately between management and the field workers.2
Another aspect of this first phase of development under Oper-
ation Bootstrap was government ownership and operation of key
industries such as cement, glass, paperboard and shoes.6 3 In addi-
55. B.W. DIFFIE & J.W. DIFFIE, supra note 53, at 213.
56. H. PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 30.
57. R. CARE, supra note 9, at 61.
58. H. PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 32.
59. R. CARR, supra note 9, at 61.
60. See generally K. WAGENHEIM, supra note 7.
61. See supra notes 30 & 50.
62. Note, supra note 31.
63. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OPERATION AND EF-
FECT OF THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION 23 (1983) [hereinafter FOURTH
TREASURY REPORT].
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tion to opening factories, the Puerto Rican government bought
utilities, developed a bank and a central planning agency, and in
general took a socialist style approach to the social and economic
problems of Puerto Rico."
Interestingly, the start-up funds for this initial program came
about as a result of the tariff provisions in the Foraker Act. The
Puerto Rican rum industry prospered as a result of World War II
because the production of alcohol on the mainland was needed for
the war effort. Therefore, Puerto Rican rum, manufactured since
1936, became popular due to its availability. Besides supplying
profits for the Puerto Rican distillers, the Puerto Rican tax reve-
nues increased due to the excise taxes on the rum.65 Under the
laws defining Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States,
excise taxes on goods manufactured in Puerto Rico were remitted
to the Puerto Rican Treasury rather than to the U.S. Treasury."
Thus, the budget of the Puerto Rican government, which before
1940 had been $22 million, increased to $150 million."
However, the factories did not create enough jobs, and there
was a shortage of the trained technicians essential to industrial de-
velopment. In addition, this "socialist" style economy frightened
away new investment capital as a result of the excise taxes on the
increased rum sales. 8 In 1946 the Tariff Commission of the United
States, reporting on the economy of Puerto Rico, found that by the
mid-1940's most Puerto Ricans still lacked "the means to feed
themselves properly, clothe themselves adequately, house them-
selves decently, or provide an elementary education for their chil-
dren or a minimum of security for their own old age." 9 The report
traced Puerto Rico's inability to find adequate remedies for its eco-
nomic problems to the low ratio of resources and productive capac-
ity in relation to the size of the population.7"
64. The bank and planning agency still exist. The bank is the Government Develop-
ment Bank. The planning board is named the Economic Development Administration and is
popularly known as Fomento.
65. 26 U.S.C. § 7652 (1982).
66. See supra text accompanying note 27.
67. E. HANSON, TRANSFORMATION: THE STORY OF MODERN PUERTO Rico 198 (1955).
68. K WAGENHEIM, supra note 7, at 244.
69. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, THE ECONOMY OF PUERTO Rico 2 (1946).
70. Id.
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2. Phase II: 1948-1970
Under the second phase of Operation Bootstrap, Puerto Rico
experienced rapid economic growth from 1948 until the early
1970's.71 Puerto Rico utilized its unique relationship with the
United States to attract private investment from the mainland.
These private investments created an increase in export ship-
ments, as well as a rise in real per capita income. The development
of private industry increased Puerto Rican taxing capacity and
provided funds for needed infrastructure and human resource de-
velopment, which supported increased development. However, the
recurring unemployment problem prevailed.72
The effect of the second stage of Operation Bootstrap was to
combine tariff-free access to the mainland markets, common cur-
rency, citizenship and law, a relatively flexible minimum wage sys-
tem, and an industrial incentive policy that centered on a tax ex-
emption program.7 This last factor was the combined result of an
exemption from local taxes and a fluke in federal law that ex-
empted mainland U.S. companies doing business in Puerto Rico
from federal taxation.
(a) Section 931, the Federal Tax Incentive. Section 931, the
main federal component of Operation Bootstrap was enacted as
Section 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921.11 Section 931 remained
substantially unchanged until the 1976 Tax Reform Act.75 The
provision was enacted to help U.S. businessmen in the Philippines.
Unlike most other countries, the United States has always taxed
its citizens on worldwide income. Although the Revenue Act of
1918 permitted citizens of the United States to take a credit in the
amount of income, war-profits, and excess-profits taxes paid to any
foreign country or to any possession of the United States for in-
come derived from local sources, it was believed that Americans
doing business abroad were discriminated against. If the local tax
rate was less than the United States' tax rate, Americans were lia-
71. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT
OF THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION 18 (1985) [hereinafter FIrTH TREA-
SURY REPORT].
72. Id.
73. UNITED STATES-PUERTO Rico COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, STATUS
OF PUERTO Rico 55-56 (1966) [hereinafter STATUS OP PUERTO Rico].
74. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 271.
75. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1520, 1645 (codified at
26 U.S.C. § 936 (1982)).
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ble for the difference. The non-American doing business in the
Philippines only paid the Philippine tax. Although the American
doing business in the Philippines only had to pay one tax because
he received credit for the foreign tax, the tax was at a higher tax
rate than the Philippine tax paid by citizens of other countries.76
The argument used to support the possessions' exemption was
that U.S. citizens doing business in an American possession should
not be placed in the same position as U.S. citizens residing in for-
eign countries because the Philippines (or any possession) was not
a foreign country. The Philippine government argued that if Amer-
ican investors in the Philippines were required to pay taxes on
their income in the Philippines equal to the amount imposed on
American citizens in the United States, there would be no induce-
ment for further investment in the possession.
Section 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921 provided that if eighty
percent of the income of citizens or domestic corporations was de-
rived from sources within a U.S. possession and fifty percent of
that income was derived from the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness, any income from sources outside the United States (both pos-
session and foreign source income) was exempt from U.S. taxa-
tion.7 Liquidation was tax free.7' However, any dividends returned
to the United States were taxed.7
9
(b) Puerto Rican Tax Incentives."0 To take advantage of Sec-
76. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1921).
77. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 271.
78. Act of August 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 102 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 332 (1982)).
79. I.R.C. § 246 (1982)(prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 1051(f)(3), 90 Stat. 1520, 1646).
80. The current Puerto Rico tax incentives are part of the Puerto Rico Industrial In-
centive Act of 1978, P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 13, §§ 255-255m (Supp. 1982).
The current Industrial Incentive Tax Act was enacted in 1978. The current incentive
program provides ninety percent exemption from income and property tax in the first five
years of a firm's operation and a gradually decreasing rate of exemption for the next twenty
years.
The Act contains provisions to encourage labor intensive industries and to assist small
firms. For an exempted manufacturing business whose industrial development income in
any year is less than $500,000, the first $100,000 of the income is totally exempted. In addi-
tion, an exempted business engaged in manufacturing may deduct five percent of its total
production payroll up to an amount not to exceed fifty percent of its industrial development
income. For this purpose, the production payroll is related to wages directly related to the
exempted economic activity. Other provisions in the Act provide benefits for businesses en-
joying tax exemption under the prior acts.
In addition, the current law allows nonlocal manufacturing enterprises several choices
in dealing with repatriation of accumulated earnings. Firms can withdraw their earnings
from Puerto Rico at any time and incur a tollgate charge of ten percent.
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tion 931, Puerto Rico enacted the Industrial Tax Exemption Act in
1948. That Act provided qualified firms with an exemption from
income, property and municipal taxes. To qualify for the exemp-
tion, a manufacturing firm had to produce either an item not pro-
duced on a commercial scale in Puerto Rico prior to 1947 or cer-
tain specified items, such as wearing apparel or processed food
items. The exemption was to be phased out by 1962.1
However, in 1954 the Industrial Tax Exemption Act was
amended and expanded to promote long-term industrial develop-
ment. The 1954 amendment provided that certain businesses were
exempt from income tax upon industrial development income for
ten years.
A 1963 version of the Act continued the exemption program
for firms establishing industrial manufacturing businesses in Pu-
erto Rico. Instead of general exemptions related to specific types of
industry, the 1963 Act provided varying lengths of exemptions
(from ten to thirty years), depending on the location of the new
business in various economic development and employment need
zones. In addition, the 1963 Act provided for elective partial ex-
emptions which correspondingly extended the length of the exemp-
tion. The exemptions focus on the manufacture of products that
were not previously manufactured in Puerto Rico at the time of
the Industrial Incentive Act of 1948 and to certain other products
designated in the Act.2
Thus, the 1948 through 1963 versions of the Act were gradu-
ally liberalized. While the 1948 Act strictly limited the exemption
to new industries and for a limited time period, the 1954 Act
added ten years of exemption for new industries to establish them-
selves in Puerto Rico and take advantage of the exemption pro-
gram. In 1960 a section was added that allowed an existing indus-
trial unit to expand and, through permission of the Governor of
Puerto Rico, be allowed a new full industrial exemption."3 The
1963 Act was more liberal in application than the prior acts. Firms
establishing businesses in specific underdeveloped economic zones
received exemptions of up to thirty years. The exemption period
was doubled if the business elected to take only a partial exemp-
81. Industrial Tax Exemption Act of 1948, P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 13, §§ 221-238 (1978).
82. Puerto Rico Industrial Incentive Act of 1963, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, §§ 252-252j
(1978).
83. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 242h(5) (1978).
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tion.84 In addition, the exemption period effectively was extended
by the provision that allowed a business to postpone the start of its
tax-exemption period up to four years from the beginning of its
operations date. 85
A concurrent Puerto Rican tax provision in effect at the time
of Operation Bootstrap was the tollgate tax. The tollgate tax was a
tax on dividends distributed by an exempt corporation to its par-
ent corporation outside Puerto Rico.86 The tollgate tax was im-
posed only if the parent corporation would claim a foreign tax
credit on the amount of the tax.87 Thus, the statute attempted to
raise revenue without increasing the parent corporation's overall
tax burden.
However, the pre-1976 tollgate statute was rarely used for Sec-
tion 931 corporations. Before 1976, a U.S. parent corporation was
fully taxed on dividends received from possessions corporations
under Sections 246(a)(B) and 901(d)(1). In order to avoid any fed-
eral or local taxes on income, the majority of possessions corpora-
tions waited until their tax-exempt status had expired in order to
repatriate their retained earnings through liquidation free of local
and federal taxes."" Although the accrual of retained earnings was
a potential source of funds for the socio-economic growth of the
Island, the corporations did not hold their funds in Puerto Rico,
but invested in markets outside Puerto Rico.8
(c) Economic Growth and Industrialization. From 1948
through the early 1970's, Puerto Rico's real GNP increased at a
higher rate than that of the U.S. mainland. Puerto Rico's economic
growth during this period was an "economic miracle."90 The U.S.
Government's 1966 report on the status of Puerto Rico provides a
description of the growth and transformation of the Puerto Rican
economy in the eighteen years following the 1948 Incentives Act.
In those eighteen years, Puerto Rico's annual gross national prod-
uct increased from $651 million to $2,757 million. The increase in
84. Id. § 252k.
85. Id. § 2521.
86. Id. § 3144 (amended by Act No. 96 of June 1, 1976).
87. Id. at 252b(a)(3) (amended by Act No. 95 of June 1, 1976).
88. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT
OF THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION SYsTEM OF TAXATION 13 (1980) [hereinafter THIRD TREA-
SURY REPORT].
89. See Madera, Reflections on Section 936, the Tollgate Tax in Puerto Rico, and the
Industrial Incentives Act of 1978, P.R. Bus. REv. at 43 (1984).
90. FOURTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 63, at 33.
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per capita personal income was from $376 to $900 in constant 1965
dollars. The labor force rose from 663,000 to 769,000, and employ-
ment grew from 589,000 to 680,000. In spite of the miraculous eco-
nomic growth, the chronic unemployment problem remained. The
report states that "the employment rate remained substantially
unchanged." 91
Under Operation Bootstrap, Puerto Rico's declining agrarian
economy was transformed into an expanding industrial structure.92
Between 1948 and 1965, agricultural employment declined from
36.3% to 17.5% of total employment, while employment in con-
struction, trade, and other service activities increased. Manufactur-
ing outside the home needlework industry more than doubled.93
During this period, a total of 1,027 new manufacturing plants lo-
cated on the Island. Net income from manufacturing increased
from $58 million to $449 million, or from ten percent to twenty
percent of the product value.94 Even though unemployment re-
mained level through the early 1970's, wages increased."0 Average
factory wages increased from $0.42 per hour in 1950 to $0.94 per
hour in 1960 to $3.11 per hour in 1977.90
The economic growth spurred advances in health, education
and the development of Puerto Rico's infrastructure. In terms of
infrastructure, the highway system in Puerto Rico grew from 2,394
kilometers in 1940, to 3,559 in 1950, to 4,700 in 1960, to 5,294 in
1965."' The telephone system grew from 17,404 telephones in
Puerto Rico in 1940, to 194,707 in 1965.11 Electric power is pro-
vided through the government-owned Water Resources Authority.
In 1940 only 28.8% of dwellings in Puerto Rico had electricity. By
1964, ninety-four percent of dwellings had electricity.9
In terms of health, Puerto Rico made astonishing progress in
the first twenty-five years of Operation Bootstrap. A person born
91. STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, supra note 73, at 54.
92. Id.
93. The home needlework industry was virtually wiped out of the Puerto Rican econ-
omy with the introduction of the minimum wage. See in/ra note 178.
94. STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, supra note 73, at 54.
95. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (discussion on the effect of the impo-
sition of the minimum wage on Puerto Rican wages).
96. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC STUDY OF PUERTO Rico 219 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter KREPS REPORT).
97. STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, supra note 73, at 183.
98. Id. at 184.
99. Id. at 168.
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in Puerto Rico in 1910 had a life expectancy of 38.2 years. In 1940
life expectancy at birth was 46.0 years. By 1965, life expectancy at
birth was 69.9 years, the same as on the U.S. mainland. 00 Infant
mortality dropped from 113.4 per 1,000 live births in 1940 to 42.3
in 1965.11 The number of persons per physician on the island de-
creased from 3,763 in 1940 to 954 in 1965.12
Education improved tremendously. University and college en-
rollment increased from 12,000 in 1950 to 152,000 in 1983.103 The
median number of years of school completed by Puerto Rican
adults over the age of twenty-five rose from 3.7 years in 1950 to 4.6
years in 1960.204
From a political perspective, Puerto Rico progressed under the
early stages of Operation Bootstrap. In 1947, Congress authorized
Puerto Rico to select its own governor, who in turn appointed the
executive officials.'0 5 The most significant federal legislation con-
cerning Puerto Rico was Public Law 600.108 Public Law 600 pro-
vided for the organization of a constitutional' 0 7 government by the
people of Puerto Rico. This Act was adopted as a "compact" al-
lowing the people of Puerto Rico to organize a government pursu-
ant to a constitution of their own adoption."0 8
Specific provision was made for an Island-wide referendum in
which the Puerto Rican people were given the opportunity to ac-
cept or to reject this legislative proposal. 05 A provision was also
made in the bill for Congress' ratification of any proposed constitu-
tion before it became effective."'
(d) Puerto Rico: 1971-1976. The Puerto Rican economy, which
had grown very rapidly in the 1950's and 1960's under Operation
Bootstrap, displayed very slow growth in the years between 1973
and 1977. This deceleration was brought about by the oil crisis and
100. Id. at 163 (life expectancy in the United States in 1910 was 50.0 years, while in
1940 it was 62.9 years).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 165.
103. Note, Puerto Rico, P.R. Bus. REv. 3 (May 1984).
104. STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, supra note 73, at 161.
105. Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 490, § 1, 61 Stat. 770.
106. Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The Constitution provides that Puerto Rico is a commonwealth, a free associated
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ensuing worldwide recession. These circumstances almost doubled
the unemployment."11 Puerto Rico's economy is closely tied to the
U.S. mainland, because of the commonwealth relationship and the
U.S. tax foundation of Operation Bootstrap. These ties subject the
Puerto Rican economy to U.S. production shifts.112
By 1975, the severity of the recession in Puerto Rico was evi-
denced in Puerto Rico's Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). According to the Kreps Report, the
GNP contracted $69 million and the GDP dropped $96 million in
constant 1954 dollars. The changes were two percent and 2.5% of
their respective levels. These relative amplitudes on contraction
were very similar to the cutbacks in gross products experienced in
the United States, but the Puerto Rican declines were slightly less
severe, and the 1976 rebound was not as strong as in the United
States." '
In the 1960's and early 1970's, manufacturing employment
continued to grow rapidly along with total employment. The labor
force grew more normally as immigration from the mainland
slowed and participation rates leveled off at about forty-five per-
cent. By the early 1970's the unemployment rate dropped to the
ten to eleven percent range.1
In 1975, however, employment dropped sharply and the unem-
ployment rate went up. In 1977, the unemployment rate was
twenty-three percent and the labor participation rate was only
forty-two percent. This low labor participation rate sharply con-
trasted to the sixty-two percent labor participation rate on the
mainland. 115
(e) Enactment of Section 936. In 1973 and 1974, the House
Ways and Means Committee held hearings on tax reform, includ-
ing the repeal of the tax-free liquidation rules for possessions cor-
porations and retention of the deferral rules on undistributed earn-
ings of foreign subsidiaries."' These hearings sparked an interest
in the revision of Section 931 and led to the enactment of Section
936 in 1976.
111. KREPS REPORT, supra note 96, at 3.
112. Id. at 4. See in/ra notes 186-89.
113. KREPS REPORT, supra note 96, at 62.
114. Id. at 63.
115. Id. at 75.
116. Bissell, The Changing Structure of the United States-Puerto Rican Tax Relation-
ship, 8 GA. J. INT'L AND COMP. L. 897, 901 (1978).
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The Puerto Rico government convinced Congress not to dis-
turb the existing relationship between the possession investment
incentives and the U.S. tax laws. Congress reasoned that the pos-
sessions would find it difficult to attract investments by U.S. cor-
porations unless Puerto Rican tax incentives were not nullified by
U.S. laws. Congress decided that certain requirements upon the
possessions, such as minimum wage laws and the use of U.S. flag-
ships for transporting goods between the mainland and the posses-
sion, substantially increased labor, transportation and other costs
of establishing business operations in the possessions, made it diffi-
cult for Puerto Rico to attract U.S. corporations.117
When Congress enacted Section 936, it affirmed the policy
that the taxation of Puerto Rico investment income was to be
treated differently, and more favorably, than the taxation of in-
come from foreign countries. Section 936 was different than Sec-
tion 931 in a number of ways. First, the new statute provided a
credit rather than an exemption for the taxation of possessions in-
come. Second, dividends could be remitted tax-free to the main-
land. Third, the new statute was enacted specifically for the bene-
fit of Puerto Rico and was to be closely watched by the U.S.
Treasury Department through their annual reports. Specifically,
Congress concluded that:
(possessions) corporations are generally to be taxed on world-
wide income in a manner similar to that applicable to any other
U.S. corporation, but (the full) foreign tax credit is to be given
for the business and qualified investment income from posses-
sions regardless of whether or not any tax is in fact paid to the
government of the possession. The effect of this revised treat-
ment will be to exempt from tax the income from business activ-
ities and qualified investments in the possessions, to allow a div-
idends received deduction for dividends from a possessions
corporation to its U.S. parent corporation, and to tax currently
all other foreign source income of possessions corporations (with
allowance for the usual foreign tax credit) .... The committee
believes that this revised treatment will assist the U.S. posses-
sion in obtaining employment-producing investments by U.S.
corporations while at the same time encouraging those corpora-
tions to bring back to the United States the earnings from these
investments to the extent they cannot be reinvested produc-
tively in the possessions. 118
117. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 254-55 (1974).
118. SEN. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 278-79 (1976).
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Although not officially part of the statute, there was an under-
standing in the House and Senate Committee Reports to the 1976
Act that the U.S. Treasury would furnish Congress with an annual
report analyzing the revenue effects of possessions corporations, as
well as the effects of Section 936 on investment and employment in
Puerto Rico and other possessions. " 9 The reports were to begin
with a report for calendar year 1976 and were to be submitted to
Congress annually within eighteen months following the close of
each calendar year. As of December 1987, five reports had been
submitted, the most recent in July 1985."0
3. Present Day Puerto Rico
The economy of Puerto Rico expanded at a fairly rapid rate
from 1976 until 1980, but slowed down between 1981 and 1983." '
International trade agreements which limited textile and apparel
exports to the United States from low wage countries, a weak dol-
lar which enhanced the tourist industry, and economic recovery in
the United States all helped the economy.' The unemployment
problem, though, did not disappear. From 1977 through 1983, the
unemployment rate was in the high teens or low twenties. ' This
figure would have been higher but for increased migration to the
mainland.'
Between 1970 and 1980, the industry composition of manufac-
turing in Puerto Rico changed dramatically. Chemicals became the
largest industry. The chemical industry grew from 11.4% to 37.3%
of the total income originating in Puerto Rican manufacturing. In-
come originating in machinery and metal products increased its
share of the total income in manufacturing by about fifty percent,
or from 19.4 to 28.3% of the total income in Puerto Rican manu-
facturing. Income from the apparel and food products industries
declined in their share of total manufacturing income in the years
1970-1980.125 Employment declined substantially in traditional la-
119. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1974). See also S. REP. No. 438, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1976).
120. The first four reports were submitted June 1978, June 1979, June 1980, and Feb.
1983.
121. FivrH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 23.
122. Note, supra note 103, at 5.
123. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 23.
124. Id. at 21.
125. Id. at 30.
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bor intensive industries and increased in high technology
industries.
Some argue that the shift in the composition of the Puerto
Rican manufacturing sector and increases in the income and capi-
tal stock of Puerto Rican manufacturing industries have produced
less than proportionate increases in manufacturing payroll and em-
ployment. The Treasury Reports measured the share of payroll
costs in total "value added" and found only 16.2% of the value
added of all industries with expanding employment went to pay-
roll, while a 37.4% share of the payroll in value added went to
industries with declining employment in Puerto Rico. In effect,
even though profits increase with high technology industries, a
much smaller percentage is going towards workers' salaries.1 26 One
conclusion might be that this situation is no different than that of
Puerto Rico at the beginning of this century. Then, the "joker in
the deck" was that the enormous profits from the sugar industry
were bypassing the Island and going directly to the mainland
investors.
III. THE "COST" OF SECTION 936
The U.S. Treasury Department, in its annual reports, used a
tax benefit analysis of Section 936 and found the statute to be
costly. The tax benefit analysis estimates the cost of Section 936
employment on a per job basis using the federal tax benefits re-
ceived by the possessions corporations.
A. The Tax Benefits Concept
Treasury estimated the federal tax benefits of possessions cor-
porations in manufacturing by applying the effective U.S. tax rate
to the qualified possession source income reported by each Section
936 manufacturing company on its U.S. income tax return, and
then subtracting income and tollgate taxes paid to Puerto Rico.1 7
Possessions corporations outside of the manufacturing sector were
presumed to pay income taxes to Puerto Rico at a rate at least
equal to the effective U.S. corporate rate, and thus presumed not
to give rise to any federal tax benefit. 28
126. FOURTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 63, at 52.
127. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 46.
128. Id.
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Treasury computed tax benefits on a per-employee basis.129
According to the most recent report (Fifth Treasury Report), the
tax benefit per manufacturing employee averaged $20,656, or
146.8% of the average employee compensation. 130 The federal tax
benefits per employee varied from one industry to another. In the
pharmaceutical industry, the average federal tax benefits
amounted to $69,200 per employee, or more than three times the
average compensation of the comparatively well-paid Puerto Rican
pharmaceutical employee."3 ' For labor intensive industries, such as
the apparel industry, the average tax benefit per employee was
only $3,030, a third of the average wage.'32
The pharmaceutical industry accounted for fifty percent of the
total federal tax benefits, compared to fifteen percent of the total
employment.' 3 The apparel industries, however, accounted for
only 2.5% of the total federal tax benefits but provided seventeen
percent of the manufacturing employment.13 4
According to the Treasury Department's reports, a direct rela-
tionship exists between a company's tax expenditure per employee
and its total compensation per employee. "This reflects a tendency
of the high-profit industries to employ more highly skilled workers
and/or a willingness to pay those workers more than they would
have been paid by other Puerto Rico employers."' 8 For instance,
the chemical industry, provides twenty percent of the total jobs in
Section 936 manufacturing firms and paid twenty-six percent of
the total employee compensation.' 36
The industries in which tax expenditure per employee were
the highest (pharmaceuticals, electrical, and electronic equip-
ment, scientific instruments, and non-electrical machinery)
tended to be the same industries in which total employment has
been growing during the past decade. Conversely, industries in
which tax expenditure per employee were the lowest (tobacco
products, textiles, apparel, leather products) tended to be those
whose employment was declining.'37
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 48.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 51.
134. Id.
135. THIRn TREASURY REPORT, supra note 88, at 51.
136. Id. at 51.
137. Id.
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At the top of the ranking are 14 companies for which the
U.S. tax benefits represented $100,000 or more per employee in
Puerto Rico. At the low end are the companies which incurred
losses and thus derived no immediate tax benefit from Section
936. The top 14 possessions corporations accounted for 29 per-
cent of the tax benefits but provided only 5 percent of the em-
ployment of the 324 manufacturing companies. The top 38 pos-
sessions corporations, those for which tax savings per employer
equalled or exceeded $50,000 in 1982, collectively accounted for
55 percent of the tax benefits and 13 percent of employment tax
benefits.'
B. Proposals to Change Section 936
In spite of the Treasury Department's negative reports on Sec-
tion 936, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 retained the possessions tax
credit.' The Joint Committee on Taxation explained that "Con-
gress believed that the credit and complementary local tax incen-
tives had promoted economic growth in Puerto Rico.""' The re-
tention, though, was not without debate. Both the Treasury
Department and the President suggested to Congress that the pos-
sessions tax credit be replaced by a wage credit.
1. Treasury's Proposal
The November 1984 Treasury Department Report to the Pres-
ident (Treasury's Proposal), proposed the repeal of Section 936."'
Treasury did "not believe that there should be a permanent tax
subsidy for operations in the possessions."' 42 However, in order to
smooth the transition from a system that provided a credit for
taxes on income earned in the possessions to a system which does
not recognize possessions corporations to be any different from for-
eign corporations, the Treasury proposed a wage credit which was
to be phased out after several years. Under Treasury's Proposal,
the amount of the wage credit was a fixed dollar amount per hour
worked. The credit would be available for all persons employed in
138. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 51.
139. I.R.C. § 936 (1986).
140. Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(H.R. 3838, 99th Cong.; Pub. L. 99-514) 1002 (Comm. Print 1987).
141. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH, 327 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY'S PROPOSAL].
142. Id. at 328.
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the possessions by a manufacturing firm. The deduction for wages
would be reduced by the amount of the credit.4 3
Under Treasury's Proposal the "wage credit would replace the
existing credit for taxable years beginning on or after January 1,
1987. It would be sixty percent of the minimum wage for a six year
period, 1987 through 1992, and then would be phased out in equal
installments over the next six years. '"1"
The proposal was to simplify the law and provide a more di-
rect, cost-effective incentive to create jobs in the possessions. Trea-
sury noted that since the tax benefits received by some current
Section 936 corporations would be substantially reduced under a
wage credit, corporations in the electronics and pharmaceutical in-
dustries might decide to restructure or even close their operations
in the possessions. The proposal, however, concludes that the wage
credit should attract more labor intensive industries to the
possessions. " 5
2. The President's Proposal
President Reagan submitted his tax simplification proposals
(The President's Proposal) to Congress in May, 1985.146 The Presi-
dent's Proposal also replaces the possessions tax credit with a wage
credit. Under The President's Proposal, though, the possessions
tax credit would be:
... repealed and replaced by a permanent wage credit. A U.S.
corporation could elect a wage credit equal to 60 percent of
wages, up to the Federal minimum wage amount, paid to per-
sons employed in the possessions by an establishment engaged
in manufacturing, plus 20 percent of such wages paid above the
Federal minimum wage amount, subject to an overall cap per
employee of four times the Federal minimum wage amount. Cor-
porations electing the wage credit would be required to reduce
their otherwise allowable deduction for wages paid by the
amount of the wage credit claimed. At the present annual mini-
mum wage amount of $6,968, and with a 33 percent corporate
tax the maximum net credit would be $5,602 per employee (67
143. Id. at 328-29.
144. Id. at 329.
145. Id.
146. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY ch. 12.05 (1985) [hereinafter THE PRESIDENT'S
PROPOSAL].
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percent of the maximum gross credit of $8,362). 47
Under The President's Proposal:
the wage credit could be used to offset the U.S. tax on any in-
come, without regard to whether such income may have arisen
from sources in a possession. The credit would not be refund-
able, but could be carried forward for 15 years.
Corporations electing the wage credit would not be entitled
to claim a foreign tax credit for taxes paid to the possessions,
but they would be allowed a deduction for such taxes, regardless
of whether they otherwise claim a credit for taxes paid to other
countries.' "
Dividends paid by corporations electing the wage credit would
be subject to the general rules with respect to dividends-received
deductions for dividends from a U.S. corporation." 9 Similar to the
findings in the annual Treasury reports and Treasury's Proposal,
the President's Proposal found the existing credit to be costly and
inefficient.
' * . The average tax benefit per employee for all section
936 corporations was more than $22,000 in 1982, more than 50
percent more than the average wage of possessions corporations'
employees of $14,210. Fourteen corporations received tax bene-
fits in excess of $100,000 per employee. Those fourteen compa-
nies accounted for 4 percent of the section 936 corporations for
which employment data was available and derived 29 percent of
the combined tax benefits.1 0
The President's Proposal concluded that the income based
possessions tax credit did not serve as a direct incentive to increase
employment. According to the proposal, the reason for the perma-
nent wage credit was the recognition of the United States' special
obligation toward the "goal of encouraging increased employment
and economic growth, in the possessions" '' and "economic health
of the Caribbean region. '"152
The President's Proposal recognized that:
147. Id. at 309.
148. Id. at 309-10.
149. Id. at 310.
150. Id. at 308.
151. Id. at 311.
152. Id.
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the proposed wage credit may be less attractive than the ex-
isting Section 936 for certain corporations, primarily those in in-
dustries such as pharmaceuticals and electronics which have
lower than average employment levels and higher intangible in-
come. Accordingly, immediate repeal of the existing credit could
cause undesirable short-term economic dislocation in the
possessions. '
C. Analysis of Cost
On closer inspection it is questionable whether a wage credit
would be more effective in increasing employment in Puerto Rico
or whether total repeal of a possessions tax credit would be less
costly to the U.S. Treasury. Congress enacted Section 936 to pro-
vide an increase in employment in a cost-effective manner.' 4 Ac-
cording to the Treasury Department, U.S. tax liabilities were re-
duced by $1,679 million in tax year 1982 by the possessions
corporation system.' 55 The reduction in federal tax liabilities under
Section 936 was estimated by applying to possessions corporations
in manufacturing the same U.S. tax rules which applied to corpo-
rations operating within the United States in 1982, and then sub-
tracting income and tollgate taxes paid to Puerto Rico."5 6
1. Flaws in Treasury's Calculations
An absolute loss of $1,697 million in tax revenues for one year
is significant. However, Treasury's cost analysis is premised on the
assumption that without the possessions credit, possessions corpo-
rations would not take advantage of other tax saving devices and
that the elimination of Section 936 would not adversely affect Pu-
erto Rico's economy. Even the Treasury Department, though,
questions whether the elimination of the possessions corporation
exemption would result in a gain to the U.S. Treasury of the tax
benefits provided to corporations as a result of Section 936, be-
cause of the alternatives available to possessions corporations if
Section 936 were repealed.'57
153. Id. at 313.
154. HR REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1975); H. CoNF. REP. No. 760, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1982).
155. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 46.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 59-61.
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As a result of Section 936, Puerto Rico is able to be, on tax
grounds, a more attractive location than the United States for
plant and equipment and other operating assets. However, from a
tax planning perspective, the tax advantages of a Puerto Rican lo-
cation for physical assets may not be significantly better than
those available in a low-tax developing country. If Section 936 were
repealed, a possessions corporation could elect to remain in Puerto
Rico as a Puerto Rican-chartered corporation, or it could move to a
foreign country, and continue to obtain the benefit of a 100% U.S.
tax exemption if the corporation "deferred taxes" by not repatri-
ating earnings until liquidation.
In a study of effective corporate tax rates for Fortune 500
companies, Tax Analysts concludes that "the recapture or turn-
around of deferred taxes will occur only for those companies that
have enjoyed little or no growth during the past several years."168
For example, the U.S. federal income tax could be avoided alto-
gether if the U.S. parent had excess foreign tax credits which could
be used to offset federal tax on dividends of foreign affiliates. 5 "
It is difficult to determine whether the repeal of Section 936
would decrease tax avoidance as a result of the transfer of in-
tangibles. Prior to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
(TEFRA) amendments, many U.S. parent corporations transferred
intangibles tax-free to possessions corporations which, in turn,
claimed as part of their income the return attributable to the in-
tangibles. The TEFRA amendments,'60 though, provided a method
to allocate income from intangibles between the parent and posses-
sions affiliate in order to "lessen the abuse caused by taxpayers
claiming tax-free income generated by intangibles developed
outside of Puerto Rico."''
Moreover, intercompany transfer pricing problems are not
unique to possessions corporations. Section 1231 of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 extends the "commensurate with income attribu-
table to the intangible" standard to foreign affiliates, as well as
possessions affiliates.'62 The Internal Revenue Service has also rec-
ognized that the abuse. extends beyond possessions corporations
and recently litigated a Section 482 case involving the transfer of
158. TAX ANALYSTS, EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX RATES 1985 4 (1986).
159. Id.
160. See 26 U.S.C. § 936(h).
161. H, CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1982).
162. I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
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an intangible to a foreign, low tax jurisdiction.163
Although certain industries locating in the possessions are able
to take advantage of the possessions tax credit, their overall effec-
tive tax rates are not as high as other industries. For example, in
1985 the effective corporate tax rate for pharmaceutical companies
was 28.25% for their U.S. tax on their U.S. income and was
30.52% on their worldwide income. (The possessions tax credit
constituted a 9.18% reduction in the U.S. corporate rate.)' Dur-
ing 1985, the effective U.S. corporate tax rate on U.S. income for
the insurance industry was 19.41%. The effective rate on world-
wide income for the insurance industry was 19.72 %.165 The bank-
ing industry, mutual, national, and state paid U.S. corporate rates
of 7.78%, 15.39%, and 16.49%, respectively, on U.S. income and
paid worldwide rates of 7.78%, 21.75%, and 19.58%, respec-
tively. 68 The mining industry as a whole paid an effective corpo-
rate tax rate of 8.13% on U.S. income and an effective worldwide
rate of 8.84% .167 The natural gas transmission industry paid a U.S.
rate of 4.70% on U.S. income and a worldwide rate of 9.43%.168
Tax Analysts studied the effective tax rates to determine the
impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The study used the effec-
tive corporate tax rates from 1985 and then applied the post tax
reform rules. In spite of the loss of the special life insurance deduc-
tion and the changes in reserves for both the insurance and bank-
ing industries, the insurance and banking industries post tax re-
form effective rates remained lower than those of the
pharmaceutical industry even though the pharmaceutical industry
retained the possessions tax credit."6 9 Moreover, the effective cor-
porate tax rate study contains the caveat that "to the extent corpo-
rations' existing operations are adversely affected by tax reform,
steps will be taken to ameliorate the impact of tax reform by
restructuring."' 7 0
163. Bausch and Lomb v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 3394-86 (U.S.T.C., filed Feb.
1986).
164. TAX ANALYSTS, supra note 158, at 4.
165. Id. at 117.
166. Id. at 31, 33, and 43.
167. Id. at 157.
168. Id. at 163.
169. TAX ANALYSTS, QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 ON EF-
FECTIVE CORPORATE TAX RATES 3, 5, 9 and 16 (1986).
170. Id. at Introduction.
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2. Economic Dislocation
Another flaw in Treasury's analysis of the "cost" of Section
936 is that it does not sufficiently address the economic dislocation
that would result with the repeal or the replacement of the posses-
sions tax credit with its concomitant cost to the federal govern-
ment. A recent report by the General Accounting Office concludes
that, although extending the U.S. income tax to Puerto Rico would
increase federal revenues in the short run (the savings would result
mainly from the elimination of Section 936), increased social costs
due to economic dislocation and reduced revenues for the same
reasons could negate that gain.171
From the perspective of an employer, the proposals to develop
labor intensive industries vis-d-vis a wage credit provide no greater
incentives than those already in place through the possessions tax
credit. Thus, there is no reason to believe more labor intensive in-
dustries would locate in Puerto Rico as a result of a credit, such as
the proposed wage credits.
For example, Under the President's Proposal, the wage credit
would have been equal to sixty percent of wages paid above the
federal minimum wage amount, subject to the overall wage cap per
employee of four times the minimum wage amount.'7 2 A corpora-
tion which elects the wage credit must reduce its deduction for
wages by the amount of the wage credit that is claimed.17 3 The
President's Proposal used the minimum wage rate of $6,968 and a
proposed corporate tax rate of thirty-three percent 74 to arrive at
the maximum net credit per employee of $5,602 on employee wages
of $27,872 or higher."'
The average wages for an employee in apparel manufacturing
is $8,954. The proposed wage credit per apparel employee is
$3,067.76 Thus, for apparel workers the amount of the credit re-
171. General Accounting Office, Welfare and Taxes: Extending Benefits and Taxes to
Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa 2-5 (1987) (TAx NOTES Microfiche
87-5939).
172. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, supra note 146, at 312.
173. Id.
174. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 fixed the top corporate rate at thirty-four per-
cent. See I.R.C. § 11 (1986).
175. Sixty percent of annual minimum wage of $6,968 = $4,180.80. 3 x 6,968 = 20,904.
Twenty percent of $20,904 = $4,180.80. Total credit - $8,362 (Sixty percent of $6,968 plus
twenty percent of $20,904). Thirty-three percent corporate tax rate. Sixty-seven percent x
8,362 = maximum of $5,602. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, supra note 146, at 309.
176. Sixty percent of $6,968 - $4,180. $8,954 - $6,968 = $1,986. Twenty percent of
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mains more or less the same under the possessions tax credit or
under the proposed wage credit. Using the wage rate from the
Fifth Treasury Report, labor intensive industries using the posses-
sions tax credit receive $3,030 per employee in tax benefits;'"
under the proposed wage credit the benefit would only be in-
creased by a little over one percent to $3,067. It is not realistic to
conclude that this enticement would sufficiently draw labor inten-
sive firms to Puerto Rico. Moreover, as a result of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, the U.S. corporate tax rate was reduced from forty-six
percent to thirty-four percent. The reduction makes investment on
the mainland considerably more attractive, and offsets other incen-
tives to draw industry to Puerto Rico.'7 8
Another dimension to the argument that a wage credit will in-
crease the number of workers employed by a possessions corpora-
tion, is that the wage credit focuses on the lower range of the wage
scale. Corporations employing minimum wage workers get a credit
of sixty percent of the wages they pay. However, corporations em-
ploying workers in the upper range of the scale receive a dimin-
ished credit, and there is no incentive to employ workers that
make more than $27,872 annually. Because the wage credit would
be less attractive than the income based possessions tax credit for
certain corporations, such as pharmaceuticals and electronics, re-
peal of Section 936 and replacement by the wage credit "could
cause undesirable short-term economic dislocation in the
possessions.' '179
The economic dislocation, whether short-term or long-term,
would be costly to the U.S. Treasury. Federal payments to Puerto
Rico have been a significant part of total funds entering the Island
and would probably increase due to the dislocation of the high
technology corporations.' For example, net federal payments
equalled 23.6% of income from productive activity in 1983. This
figure takes into account the termination of the public service jobs
programs and, to a lesser extent, the statutory ceiling imposed on
federal nutritional assistance to Puerto Rico.'""
$1,986 = $398. Total credit = $4,578. Sixty-seven percent - $3,067.
177. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 48.
178. I.R.C. § 11 (1986).
179. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, supra note 146, at 313.
180. See V.S. CLARK, PORTO Rico [sic] AND ITS PROBLEMS 410, 413 (1930); FIFTH TREA-
SURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 23.
181. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 5.
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The net migration of residents of Puerto Rico to the mainland
would probably increase. In 1983, the number of persons migrating
to the mainland from Puerto Rico was over 44,000."8' Any eco-
nomic dislocation will only increase those figures and increase costs
to the U.S. Treasury. Not only is there the potential for increased
migration, but because unemployment will focus on more skilled
jobs, a "brain drain" could take place.
In addition, proposals to substitute the possessions tax credit
with a wage credit or to repeal the possessions credit altogether do
not take into account the multiplier component of Section 936 in-
dustries. "High employment multipliers indicate that the industry
has a substantial impact on employment in other industries
through its extensive linkages in the Puerto Rican economy."''
Thus, in addition, to those employees directly being affected by
the elimination of the credit, a ripple effect would occur, increasing
unemployment proportionately. A study by Robert R. Nathan As-
sociates, Inc. estimates that for 1984 direct employment for Sec-
tion 936 corporations amounted to 94,433 direct jobs and an addi-
tional 154,270 indirect jobs.184
Mere speculation that the possessions tax credit will be re-
placed or repealed demonstrates the adverse consequences such an
action would have on the Puerto Rican economy. A recent survey
of existing Section 936 firms attempted to determine the effect of
uncertainty at the time of the TEFRA amendments in 1982, and
the proposals to replace the possessions tax credit with a wage
credit in 1985 on investment in Puerto Rico. The survey found
that thirty-nine percent of the companies with plants in Puerto
Rico delayed future investment in Puerto Rico in 1982 as a result
of uncertainty over the future of Section 936 at that time. The
delayed projects were estimated to be worth $150 million with con-
comitant job projections of close to 2,000 employees. In 1985, the
delayed investments amounted to around $120 million and the
temporary job loss was expected to be around 2,000.85
182. Id. at 21.
183. Robert R. Nathan Associates, Section 936 and Economic Development in Puerto
Rico (prepared for the Puerto Rico USA Foundation) 36 (August 1987) (TAx NoTES Micro-
fiche No. 87-5513).
184. Id. at 38.
185. Id. at 22.
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IV. PUERTO Rico NEEDS FEDERAL INCENTIVES TO CONTINUE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ITS INFRASTRUCTURE
A. U.S. Requirements
U.S. requirements have shaped Puerto Rico's dependent econ-
omy and ability to attract new industry. The inclusion within the
U.S. tariff borders, as well as the sharing of U.S. currency, stimu-
lated trade between Puerto Rico and the mainland United States.
The omission of duties on Puerto Rican exports to the mainland
United States gave Puerto Rico an advantage over outside compet-
itors186 and strengthened her ties with the United States. At the
same time, though, Puerto Rico's close ties to the United States
have hindered her competitive position.
1. Customs
Puerto Rico is part of the same customs system as the United
States, and it maintains the same duties on imports from foreign
countries as does the rest of the United States. "The result is to
eliminate foreign countries as a potential source of supply for
many types of products, and at the same time increase their cost to
Porto Rico [sic] because of no independent control over tariffs. 187
2. Shipping
In addition, U.S. shipping laws1" have influenced Puerto
Rico's competitive position. Since their enactment, these shipping
laws have required that goods moving between the United States
and Puerto Rico be carried on American ships. The economic sig-
nificance is that Puerto Rican imports and exports traditionally
carry higher shipping rates than if Puerto Rico were free to utilize
the cheaper carriers of other countries. 189 The shipping require-
ment influences the development of the Puerto Rican economy in
at least four ways:1" '
(1) it increases the cost of Puerto Rican imports by the extent
to which rates charged by American ships are higher than those
186. V.S. CLARK, supra note 180, at 410.
187. Id.
188. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 877 (1982).
189. V.S. CLARK, supra note 180, at 411.
190. See V.S. CLARK, supra note 180, at 410-11.
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charged by ships of other countries;
(2) the shipping requirement offsets the advantage which tariff
free access to the U.S. mainland gives Puerto Rico in selling to the
mainland;
(3) Puerto Rico would have been able to build up greater trad-
ing links with foreign countries if it had been free to use foreign
shipping; and
(4) if the port of entry for foreign goods could have been Pu-
erto Rico rather than the United States, the Puerto Rican Trea-
sury would have collected the import duties on those goods. Due to
the foreign shipping requirement, foreign goods transported on for-
eign ships enter Puerto Rico through U.S. ports and are re-ex-
ported to Puerto Rico on U.S. ships.
3. Limited Ability to Negotiate Tax Treaties""
Puerto Rico is limited in the promotion of foreign investment
because it is not able to be a party to any double taxation agree-
ments. Since the Jones Act, Puerto Rico has had its own system of
taxation. As a result, Puerto Rico is not a party to any U.S. double
taxation agreements. Unlike developing countries, Puerto Rico
cannot promote investment through tax holidays because the in-
centives are lost through double taxation or limited by a foreign
tax credit system for taxes actually paid.
In 1986, Puerto Rico attempted to negotiate a "tax sparing"
treaty with Japan to promote Japanese investment. Under the
terms of the proposed treaty, Japan would have given a foreign tax
credit to Japanese firms investing in Puerto Rico for the Puerto
Rican taxes which would have been paid but for Puerto Rico's in-
centives. The proposed treaty would have been directly between
Puerto Rico and Japan. The U.S. State Department took a year to
determine that it would not authorize Puerto Rico to proceed with
negotiations on the grounds that it violated U.S. policy. Under Pu-
erto Rico's commonwealth status, Puerto Rico needs the permis-
sion of the United States before it enters into negotiations leading
191. For a discussion of Puerto Rico's ability to be a party to tax treaties, see Davidson,
Tax Sparing: A Question of Treasury Policy or Puerto Rico Politics, 35 TAx NOTES 731
(1987). The Constitution of Puerto Rico provides that Puerto Rico, in its commonwealth
status, is free of superior authority in the management of its own local affairs, but is linked
to the United States and hence is a part of the political system in a matter compatible with
its federal structure.
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to international agreements.
B. Loss of Competitive Advantages
The U.S. Treasury found that when Puerto Rico introduced
its tax exemption program in 1948, a number of factors made Pu-
erto Rico a highly competitive location for U.S. firms. Through the
1960's, labor cost was low relative to the U.S. mainland and the
worker's high productivity contributed to Puerto Rico's competi-
tive position. Puerto Rico had the advantage that it was inside the
U.S. tariff wall and offered a more stable political and economic
environment than countries in Latin America and the Far East.19
A number of factors contributed to the decline in investment in
labor intensive industries in Puerto Rico.
1. Increased Cost of Labor
The U.S. Treasury Department concluded that high wages
were the most significant factor in reducing Puerto Rico's competi-
tive advantage in attracting investment. The average hourly wages
of production workers in manufacturing industries in Puerto Rico
rose much more rapidly than U.S. wages between 1955 and 1971,
and rose slightly faster than U.S. wages in most industries after
1971.193
One reason for the rise in manufacturing wages was the blan-
ket imposition of the minimum wage on Puerto Rico in the late
1930's.94 The imposition of the minimum wage threatened the en-
tire economy of the Island at the time. For example, the hand nee-
dlework industry, which, at its peak in 1936, had become Puerto
Rico's second largest industry, was almost extinguished by the im-
position of the minimum wage because the higher wages made it
impossible for Puerto Rico to compete with the low wage countries
of the Far East.19"
The Fair Labor Standards Act which imposed the minimum
wage was amended in 1940 to remedy the disastrous situation. 196
192. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 23.
193. Id. at 29.
194. FOURTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 63, at 43. See Fair Labor Standards Act, ch.
676, 52 Stat. 10610 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 205-206 (1982)).
195. 86 CONG. REC. 5363 (1940).
196. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 432, 54 Stat. 615 (1940).
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The 1940 amendments fixed wages for Puerto Rico by industry.
Under the 1940 amendment, the wages were to be high enough to
discourage the migration of businesses from the mainland, but low
enough to attract industrial development to the Island."" How-
ever, the lower rates did not attract U.S. industries to any appreci-
able extent. By 1977, the average hourly wage in manufacturing in
Puerto Rico was $3.11 per hour compared to the minimum wage
rate of $2.30 per hour.19
The Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in 1977, and
higher statutory levels were established. As a result, almost all Pu-
erto Rican workers were to receive the U.S. minimum wage. 99
Ironically, one of the arguments for the extension of the minimum
wage to Puerto Rican workers in 1977 was that it was necessary in
order to retain labor intensive industries in Puerto Rico. It was
reasoned that increased productivity was the result of laborers'
skills and training, available machinery and equipment, technol-
ogy, management's administrative organization and efficiency and
the employees' attitude towards their work. It was argued that
"fair compensation is an indispensable element in developing
proper motivation for work."'2 00
In addition to the minimum wage, a number of other factors
tied to Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States increased
the real cost of labor in Puerto Rico. For instance, the expansion of
federal income maintenance programs in Puerto Rico may have in-
creased the cost of labor because such programs may reduce work
incentives, and by inducing higher labor turnover rates, raise la-
bor-training costs.2 1
In addition, some have viewed the possessions tax credit itself
as a cause of higher wages in Puerto Rico. The proposition set
forth to support this theory is that some industry committees, au-
thorized by the Fair Labor Standards Act have set Puerto Rican
minimum wages at levels higher than in the absence of the
favorable tax treatment.202
197. 86 CONG. REC. 5363 (1940).
198. KREPS REPORT, supra note 96, at 219.
199. Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2(e), 91 Stat. 1246 (1977).
200. H.R. REP. No. 521, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 56 (1977) (individual view of Resident
Commissioner Baltasar Corrada).
201. FOURTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 63, at 47.
202. STATUS OF PUERTO Rico, supra note 73, at 75.
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2. Changes in the U.S. Taxation Laws
Changes in the United States' domestic taxation laws also af-
fected the relative profitability of locating in Puerto Rico. Since
1962, Congress reduced the corporate tax rate,03 introduced in-
vestment tax credits and liberalized the period over which assets
could be depreciated for federal tax purposes. As the result of
these domestic taxation changes, the overall effective tax rate on
income earned from physical capital decreased, and the attraction
of tax exemption for physical investment in Puerto Rico
decreased.2
0 4
3. Changes in the U.S. Tariff Schedule2 5
Changes in the U.S. tariff schedule in the 1960's reduced the
locational advantage of Puerto Rico relative to foreign countries as
the price advantage Puerto Rican products could enjoy in the U.S.
market was cut. During the Kennedy Round of negotiations, tariffs
fell by forty percent to fifty percent.20 As a result, U.S. imports of
clothing from Puerto Rico fell from thirty percent of all U.S. im-
ports in 1965 to nine percent in 1976. On the other hand, Hong
Kong's percentage rose from fifteen to twenty-three, Korea's per-
centage from one to seventeen, and Taiwan's percentage from two
to sixteen of U.S. imports of clothing for the same time period.10 7
C. Puerto Rico Needs the Possession Tax Credit to Compete
with Other High Technology Economies
A wage credit, such as the one suggested in The President's
Proposal, would not be sufficient to attract labor intensive indus-
tries back to Puerto Rico because the federal minimum wage, as
well as other cost factors such as social security taxes that must be
paid by employers and fringe benefits, have already driven many of
the labor intensive industry companies out of Puerto Rico to low
203. As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the current top corporate rate is thirty-
four percent. I.R.C. § 11 (1986). The relatively low rate has caused some countries to dub
the United States as a "tax haven." See International Tax Institute Conference Papers,
Minimizing Taxes - 1987, (June, 1987).
204. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 29.
205. The Caribbean Basin Initiative specifically exempts textiles from tariff free access
to the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1985).
206. FiTn TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 30.
207. KREPS REPORT, supra note 96, at 108.
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wage jurisdictions. Under the wage credit suggested by The Presi-
dent's Proposal, the hourly wage of an apparel worker in Puerto
Rico would have been reduced from $4.35 an hour to $2.14 an
hour, not including fringe benefits.""' This reduction does not be-
gin to make Puerto Rico competitive with other locations for labor
intensive industries, such as apparel manufacturing. Apparel work-
ers make 35 cents per hour in Haiti; 65 cents per hour in Costa
Rica; 82 cents per hour in the Dominican Republic; 83 cents per
hour in Korea; $1.25 per hour in Taiwan and $1.62 per hour in
Hong Kong.209 Other countries competing for labor intensive in-
dustries have a significant advantage over Puerto Rico.
It is unlikely that any wage credit will be sufficient to make
Puerto Rican wages competitive with those from Haiti or Costa
Rica for labor intensive industries. Those countries with which Pu-
erto Rico competes are moving away from labor-intensive indus-
tries. Countries such as Korea and Taiwan realize they are not able
to compete with low wage countries for labor intensive industries21
and are providing incentives to attract high technology industries.
Even though hourly wages for workers in manufacturing are only
$1.25 in Taiwan and 83 cents in Korea, these countries provide in-
centives that promote high technology industry. For example,
under Korea's Foreign Capital Inducement Law, foreign-invested
enterprises requiring high-technology or large capital investments
receive tax privileges.2 ' The foreign corporation can exempt or re-
duce its taxes in proportion to the number of shares owned by for-
eign investors. The exemption from taxes is for any continuous five
year period selected by the taxpayer within the first ten years after
registration as a foreign-invested enterprise. The reduction in taxes
allows an amount equivalent to 100% of the ordinary depreciation
for fixed assets of the enterprise to be additionally deductible as
208. Average wage $4.35/hr. Credit on minimum wage 60% of $3.35/hr. = $2.01. Credit
on remaining $1.00, 20% of $1.00/hr.= $.20. Credit = $2.21. Net wage paid by employer
$2.14.
209. All statistics are for 1986-87. Statistics from Haiti, Costa Rica and the Dominican
Republic are based on conversations with embassy officials. Statistics from Korea, Taiwan
and Hong Kong are from the U.S. Department of Labor, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Au-
gust, 1987).
210. The 'four dragons' lose their fire, Bus. WK., Mar. 28, 1983, at 64.
211. MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF KOREA, TAX BUREAU, KOREAN TAXATION 252 (1985). A
May 1987 newsletter from Seihwa Accounting Corp. (Seoul, Korea) stated that the Korean
Ministry of Finance announced changes in tax exemption opportunities for foreign inves-
tors. However, tax exemption changes would be available for foreign investment in 40 spe-
cific advanced technology business areas, even in cases where the foreign shareholder ratio is
100%.
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special depreciation. In Taiwan, incentives similar to the Korean
incentives are available that encourage a number of different types
of investment, including those that are capital and technology in-
tensive. Taiwan offers an additional deferral of taxes for high tech-
nology and capital intensive industries.2"
Section 936 has been successful in helping Puerto Rico com-
pete with countries such as Korea and Taiwan in attracting high
technology industry. In 1960, 3.4% of the Puerto Rican net manu-
facturing income was in the chemical area. By 1983, 36.8% of the
net income from manufacturing was in the chemical industry.
2 13
Section 936 provided the tax incentives for this development. By
1981, high technology industries accounted for thirty-eight percent
of the manufacturing employment in Puerto Rico.2 4 By 1984, the
share of manufacturing employment directly attributable to pos-
sessions corporations (which are mainly high technology firms) was
sixty-one percent.21
V. CONCLUSION
The current ambivalency over Section 936 neither increases
federal revenue nor fully supports Puerto Rico's economic develop-
ment as a high technology economy. Robert R. Nathan Associates,
in a study prepared for the Puerto Rico U.S.A. Foundation, a coa-
lition of Section 936 corporations, concludes that uncertainty over
Section 936 has created an unstable tax environment. Thus, he
concludes businesses cancel investments because of the long-term
instability of the tax environment. The Tax Reform Act of 1986,
though, is not unique to Puerto Rico in creating an unstable envi-
ronment. For example the Act eliminated capital gains and invest-
ment tax credits, changed depreciable lives, and included treaty
overrides. 2 e
The history of Puerto Rico's relationship with the United
States demonstrates that it is Congress' lack of direction in defin-
212. Taiwan Statute for Encouragement of Investment, art. VII (amended Dec. 1984)
(translated by Lee and Li).
213. FIFTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 71, at 31.
214. FOURTH TREASURY REPORT, supra note 63, at 52.
215. Id. at 28.
216. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). See §§ 302,
702, and 1241. For a discussion of treaty overrides, including the branch profits tax, see
Forry & Karlin, 1986 Act: Overrides, Conflicts, and Interactions with U.S. Income Tax
Treaties, 793 TAx NOTES (1987).
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ing the mainland's obligation to its dependencies that is wreaking
havoc with the Puerto Rican economy, not merely its ambivalence
towards Section 936. Examples of indecisions which have scarred
the Puerto Rican economy include:
1. the tariff imposed by the Foraker Act which allowed the
U.S. sugar corporations to buy the sugar plantations and export
the profits to the mainland;
2. the imposition of the minimum wage which skewed the
economy so it was no longer able to compete with its natural rivals;
3. a tariff-free trade situation with the United States whose
economic benefits are negated by U.S. shipping requirements; and
4. the denial by the State Department to allow Puerto Rico to
negotiate tax treaties with Japan and other countries in order to
extend investment incentives beyond Section 936.
The fundamental question which needs to be answered before
the possessions tax credit can be tackled is the same one asked at
the time Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States. "How should
the United States treat her dependencies?" Once that question is
answered, the decision can be made to analyze the possessions tax
credit in terms of providing support for the Puerto Rican economy
or in terms of the Treasury Department's concerns over lost tax
liabilities.
Puerto Rico needs Section 936 in order to remain competitive
with similarly situated economies. Without U.S. investment
through Section 936, Puerto Rico is not able to use its investment
incentives to attract foreign investment.
Even though it might be argued certain high technology firms
are reaping tremendous tax benefits as a result of Section 936, this
situation is different than that of "the joker in the deck" at the
beginning of this century. As a result of favorable federal tax treat-
ment, Puerto Rico has been transformed from a Caribbean poor-
house to a high technology economy. Puerto Rico has profited by
receiving a sophisticated infrastructure.
Unfortunately, a simple wage credit is not the solution to Pu-
erto Rico's chronic unemployment problem. Perhaps, though, the
sophisticated infrastructure as a result of Section 936 will provide
the cushion for Puerto Rico to develop its own solutions to the
unemployment problem.
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